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INTEREST OF AMICI 
 Justice and Freedom Fund, as amicus curiae, respectfully submits that the 
District Court decision should be affirmed. 
 Justice and Freedom Fund ("JFF") is a California non-profit, tax-exempt 
corporation formed on September 24, 1998 to preserve and defend the 
constitutional liberties guaranteed to American citizens.  JFF is interested in 
striking down the Patient Protection and Affordable Health Care Act, Pub. L. No. 
111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) ("the Act" or "PPAHCA") in order to preserve the 
individual liberties guaranteed by the Bill of Rights and restrict congressional 
authority to the powers enumerated in the U.S. Constitution.   
 JFF's founder is James L. Hirsen, professor of law at Trinity Law School and 
Biola University in Southern California and author of New York Times bestseller, 
Tales from the Left Coast, and Hollywood Nation.   Mr. Hirsen has taught law 
school courses on constitutional law.  Co-counsel Deborah J. Dewart is the author 
of Death of a Christian Nation, released in 2010. 
 The parties have consented to the filing of this brief.   
FED. R. APP. P. 29(C)(5) STATEMENT 
 No party's counsel has authored this brief in whole or in part, and no party or 
party's counsel has contributed money that was intended to fund the preparation or 
submission of this brief.  No person, other than amicus curiae, its members, or its 
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counsel, contributed money that was intended to fund the preparation or 
submission of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
 I.   Whether the District Court properly concluded that Section 1501 of 
the Act exceeds the powers of Congress under Article I of the U.S. Constitution; 
and 
 II. Whether the District Court properly concluded that Section 1501 is 
not severable from the remainder of the Act, and therefore, the entire Act should be 
stricken as unconstitutional.   
 Amicus curiae contends that the District Court was correct on both points. 
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
 Amicus curiae Justice and Freedom Fund concurs with the District Court 
that the Commerce Clause does not grant Congress authority to compel every 
American to purchase health insurance.  The Necessary and Proper Clause cannot 
salvage the Act, because Congress itself created the financial "necessity" for the 
individual mandate—its centerpiece.  The mandate is "necessary" but manifestly 
improper—it exceeds congressional powers under the Commerce Clause and 
jeopardizes fundamental freedoms that Americans cherish.   
 The District Court rightly struck down the entire Act.  While this may 
appear to encroach on legislative territory, it actually preserves the separation of 
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powers by not entangling the court in the extensive rewriting necessary to ferret 
out the sections that can and cannot be sustained after the mandate is excised.   
I. NEITHER THE COMMERCE CLAUSE NOR THE NECESSARY 
AND PROPER CLAUSE CAN SALVAGE THE PERVERSE 
"NECESSITY" CONGRESS ITSELF CREATED.  
 The text and history of the Commerce Clause do not support the Act's 
breathtaking expansion of congressional authority.  An individual decision not to 
purchase insurance is inactivity—not activity that substantially affects interstate 
commerce.  Lacking the power to enact the mandate, Congress cannot manufacture 
a "necessity" and then use the Necessary and Proper Clause to jump-start the Act:  
[R]ather than being used to implement or facilitate enforcement of the 
Act's insurance industry reforms, the individual mandate is actually 
being used as the means to avoid the adverse consequences of the Act 
itself.  Such an application of the Necessary and Proper Clause would 
have the perverse effect of enabling Congress to pass ill-conceived, or 
economically disruptive statutes, secure in the knowledge that the 
more dysfunctional the results of the statute are, the more essential or 
"necessary" the statutory fix would be. 
 
Florida v. United States Dep't. of Health & Human Services, No. 3:10-cv-91-
RV/EMT, *110-111 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8822 (N.D. Fla. Jan. 31, 2011) 
("Florida v. HHS").  
 Congress cannot generate regulatory power merely because it sees a national 
problem in need of repair.  "[T]he Framers considered Congress to be the most 
dangerous branch of government...."  David B. Rivkin, Jr., Lee A. Case, and Jack 
M. Balkin, A Healthy Debate: The Constitutionality of an Individual Mandate, 158 
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U. Pa. L. Rev. PENNumbra 93, 96 (2009) ("A Healthy Debate ").  The Constitution 
grants Congress "defined and limited" powers, and "those limits may not be 
mistaken or forgotten."  Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 176 (1803) (Marshall, 
C.J.). 
   Lopez and Morrison rest on the principle of enumerated powers—not 
merely the presence or absence of economic activity.  A Healthy Debate, 158 U. 
Pa. L. Rev. PENNumbra at 99; see United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 568 
(1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring).  The exercise of Commerce Clause power 
demands a "meaningful limiting factor."  A Healthy Debate, 158 U. Pa. L. Rev. 
PENNumbra at 99.  No such factor is apparent when examining the Act. 
A. Federal Regulation Of The Insurance Industry Is On The Outer 
Perimeter Of Commerce Clause Authority.     
 Regulation of the insurance business is a modern expansion of Commerce 
Clause power.  Insurance contracts were previously outside the ambit of the Clause 
because they are not "transaction[s] of commerce," objects of "trade or barter," or 
"commodities to be shipped" or sold interstate.  Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 
168, 183 (1868).       
 This has changed.  Congress may now regulate the insurance industry under 
the Commerce Clause.  United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Assoc., 322 
U.S. 533 (1944).  But the McCarran-Ferguson Act, enacted in 1945, declared that 
state regulation of the insurance business is in the public interest.  15 U.S.C. 
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§ 1011.  Since then the insurance industry has been regulated almost exclusively 
by the states.  Florida v. HHS., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8822, *44 n. 11.  But while 
Congress may regulate the insurance business, core state police powers include 
authority to protect the health of its citizens.  Barsky v. Board of Regents, 347 U.S. 
442, 449 (1954).  
1. The Individual Mandate Is Not Rationally Related To The 
Implementation Of Congressional Power To Regulate The 
Health Insurance Industry.   
 The Court must "look to see whether the [mandate] constitutes a means that 
is rationally related to the implementation of a constitutionally enumerated power."  
United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949, 1956 (2010).  "Rationally related" and 
"rational basis" are terms to employ with caution.  Id. at 1966 (Kennedy, J., 
concurring).  "Rational basis" is commonly employed in connection with due 
process.  In the Commerce Clause context, there should be a "tangible link to 
commerce, not a mere conceivable rational relation."  Id. at 1967. 
 The District Court zoomed in on the individual decision about health 
insurance and considered whether that activity—or inactivity—can be regulated.  
Power to regulate the insurance industry does not embrace the authority to compel 
individuals to do business with that industry.  Even if more customers are 
"necessary" to prevent the industry's financial collapse, it is not proper to forcibly 
enroll them.  This case thus contrasts with Nat'l Labor Relations Bd. v. Jones & 
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Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937), upholding an injunction requiring 
employers to deal only with their employees' chosen representatives.  Unlike 
PPAHCA, the National Labor Relations Act did not compel any agreement 
between private parties.  Id. at 44-45.  But unlike the NLRB employers and 
employees, who remained free to negotiate individual contracts, all Americans 
(with rare exception) will soon be compelled to purchase a government-defined 
product.   
2. The Individual Mandate Is Hardly A "Modest" Addition 
To Any Existing Exercise Of Federal Power.  Many 
Portions Of The Constitution Would Be Superfluous If 
Congress Could Arbitrarily Regulate Anything Under The 
Commerce Clause Umbrella.   
 In Comstock, the Supreme Court upheld a "modest addition" to a preexisting 
set of federal prison-related mental-health statutes.  United States v. Comstock, 130 
S. Ct. at 1958.  But the Court cautioned that "even a longstanding history of related 
federal action does not demonstrate a statute's constitutionality."  Id.  
 The insurance mandate is not anchored to any existing federal power and it 
erodes basic American freedoms.  Never before has the federal government 
required every individual to purchase a particular product or service as a 
"necessary" adjunct to its regulation of the industry that supplies it.  The power to 
regulate an industry does not clothe Congress with authority to command every 
American to do business with that industry.  If the Commerce Clause stretched that 
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far, "many of Congress' other enumerated powers under Art. I, § 8, [would be] 
wholly superfluous"—bankruptcy laws (cl. 4), coining money (cl. 5), fixing 
weights and measures (cl. 5), punishing counterfeiters (cl. 6), post offices and 
roads (cl. 7), patents and copyrights (cl. 8).  United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 
588-589 (Thomas, J., concurring).  These powers overlap and affect interstate 
commerce, but their express enumeration cautions restraint in the extension of 
Commerce Clause power.  That Clause cannot swallow all the other federal powers 
and sweep within its scope any law Congress wants to pass.   
3. The Individual Mandate Is Not An Appropriate Means To 
Reform The Insurance Industry.  The Link Is Too 
Attenuated.   
 Congress has considerable discretion to enact laws that are conducive to its 
exercise of legitimate authority.  Commonwealth of Va. v. Sebelius, 728 F. Supp. 
2d 768, 778 (E.D. Va. 2010; United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1956; 
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 304, 408 (1819).  If Congress 
appropriates funds under its Spending Clause authority, Art. I, § 8, cl. 1, "it has 
corresponding authority under the Necessary and Proper Clause, Art. I, § 8, cl. 18, 
to see to it that taxpayer dollars...are in fact spent for the general welfare, and not 
frittered away...."  Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600, 605 (2004).  But even 
though "necessary" does not mean "absolutely necessary," there still must be an 
"appropriate link" between a constitutional power and a law Congress enacts.  
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United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1970 (Alito, J., concurring).  Here, the link 
is a thin thread.    
 The connection between means and end must not be so attenuated as to 
require a court to "pile inference upon inference."  United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 
at 567; United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1963.  Analysis of the causal chain 
should consider not only "the number of links" but also "the strength of the chain."  
Id. at 1966 (Kennedy, J., concurring).  The Comstock majority found the statute at 
issue was a "reasonably adapted and narrowly tailored means" to pursue a 
legitimate government interest.  Id. at 1965. 
 To sustain the Act's mandate would require this Court to "pile inference 
upon inference"—an approach the Supreme Court has rejected: 
[T]he mere status of being without health insurance, in and of itself, 
has absolutely no impact whatsoever on interstate commerce (not 
"slight," "trivial," or "indirect," but no impact whatsoever).   
 
Florida v. HHS, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8822, *92.  The Government can only 
make the connection to interstate commerce by heaping up inferences and 
speculating about future contingencies in the lives of the uninsured.  Id. at *93.     
B. The Regulated "Activity"—The Decision Not To Purchase Health 
Insurance—Is Actually Inactivity. 
 The mandate does not regulate activity—it commands activity and penalizes 
inactivity.  Its validity hinges on whether inactivity—the decision not to enter the 
health insurance market—is activity.  Commonwealth of Virginia v. Sebelius, 728 
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F. Supp. 2d at 781; Florida v. HHS, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8822, *81.  The 
mandate is imposed on every American for merely existing—not for engaging in 
any activity.  This is even less defensible than the legislation struck down in Lopez 
and Morrison—both involved activity.  A Healthy Debate, 158 U. Pa. L. Rev. 
PENNumbra at 99. 
 Never before has a Commerce Clause case involved a federal mandate that 
every American buy a certain product or contract with a private party.  Cases 
always implicate pre-existing activity—never inactivity.  Florida v. HHS, 2011 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8822, *80-81; Commonwealth of Virginia v. Sebelius, 728 F. 
Supp. 2d at 781.  See, e.g., Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824) 
(navigation); United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110 (1942) (milk 
distribution); Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 256-
257 (1964) (collecting cases); Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971) ("loan 
sharking"); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (gun possession in school zone); 
Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005) (marijuana). 
 The term activity runs like a thread through all the Commerce Clause cases.  
Congress may regulate economic activities—even intrastate activities—that 
substantially affect interstate commerce.  Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 128-
129 (1942); Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. at 151; United States v. Lopez, 514 
U.S. at 559; United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 610 (2000); Gonzales v. 
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Raich, 545 U.S. at 17-18.   Even a noneconomic local activity may be regulated if 
it is an essential component of a larger regulatory scheme.  United States v. Lopez, 
514 U.S. at 561.  Economic activity in illegal products may be regulated.  Gonzales 
v. Raich, 545 U.S. at 26 (marijuana).     
 As a threshold matter, courts must define the regulated activity.  Moreover, 
the inquiry under Lopez and Morrison is not about the effect of a regulation on 
commerce, but whether the regulated activity itself affects commerce.   United 
States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 614-615, quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 
at 557 n. 2 ("Simply because Congress may conclude that a particular activity 
substantially affects interstate commerce does not necessarily make it so.") 
 Here, the subject of regulation is the health insurance market, not the health 
care market.  Florida v. HHS, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8822, *84-85 n. 18.  Even if 
health care services—an activity—affect interstate commerce, it does not follow 
that the regulated inactivity—the decision not to purchase insurance—affects 
commerce.  Congress' own attorneys warned that it was questionable "whether a 
requirement to purchase health insurance is really a regulation of an economic 
activity or enterprise, if individuals who would be required to purchase health 
insurance are not, but for this regulation, a part of the health insurance market.  
CRS Analysis, supra, at 3, 6."  Id. at *82.   
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 The implications are staggering.  Under the Government's expansive view of 
its authority, "if the decision to forego insurance qualifies as activity, then 
presumably the decision to not use that insurance...is also activity."  Id. at *102-
103.  Extending that rationale, Congress could manufacture the power to regulate 
economic decisions "not to go to the doctor for regular check-ups and screenings" 
because healthier Americans are more productive.  Id. at, *103.  This possibility is 
not "irrelevant [or] fanciful" but part of a serious discussion among legal scholars.  
Id. at *87-88.  It is difficult to imagine any limitations on federal power if 
Congress can compel participation in a market.  See Commonwealth of Virginia v. 
Sebelius, 728 F. Supp. 2d  at  781 ("This broad definition of the economic activity 
subject to congressional regulation lacks logical limitation and is unsupported by 
Commerce Clause jurisprudence."); Florida v. HHS, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8822, 
*97-98 ("The decisions of whether and when (or not) to buy a house, a car, a 
television, a dinner, or even a morning cup of coffee also have a financial impact 
that—when aggregated with similar economic decisions—affect the price of that 
particular product or service and have a substantial effect on interstate 
commerce."); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564 ("[I]f we were to accept the 
Government's arguments, we are hard pressed to posit any activity by an individual 
that Congress is without power to regulate.").  
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C. Congress Does Not Have Unlimited Power To Regulate Every 
Individual Decision Merely Because It Has Potential Economic 
Consequences.   
 Many decisions have economic consequences.  A contribution to charity is 
economic and may even impact interstate commerce, but Congress may not 
regulate it under the Commerce Clause.  A grandmother's interstate birthday gift to 
her grandchild is "economic" and impacts commerce when the child spends it at 
the mall—but again, Commerce Clause regulation is inappropriate.  Americans 
make a myriad of monetary decisions that impact the economy, but not all are 
subject to federal regulation.   Economic is not equivalent to commercial and not 
every economic decision is an activity subject to Commerce Clause power.  
Florida v. HHS, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8822, *102. 
 Moreover, the decision to forego health insurance is not necessarily a 
"calculated decision to engage in market timing" as the Government contends.  Id. 
at *96.  It may be based on religion, conscience, the ability to pay out of pocket, or 
exercise of the constitutional right to refuse medical care.  Health care decisions 
are highly personal and cannot be hastily lumped with commercial or even 
economic activity.  The mandate is a "bridge too far" that has no logical limits and 
far exceeds existing Commerce Clause boundaries.  Id. at *104.  Supreme Court 
precedent rejects the "but-for causal chain" as a rationale to justify the regulation 
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of anything that might possibly affect interstate commerce.  United States v. 
Morrison, 529 U.S. at 615. 
D. The Necessary and Proper Clause Is Not A Separate Grant Of 
Authority That Congress Can Use To Penalize Americans Who 
Decline To Purchase Health Insurance. 
 The Government seeks solace in the Necessary and Proper Clause.  
Commonwealth of Va. v. Sebelius, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 776, 778.  But that Clause 
cannot save the law.  The mandate is "necessary" to the Act but constitutionally 
improper.  Since the Government may regulate and reform the insurance business, 
it presumes that it may also compel individuals to purchase policies, in order to 
make the law financially viable and prevent economic catastrophe.  This reasoning 
is flawed.  The Government's warped application of the Necessary and Proper 
Clause converts it to the "hideous monster with devouring jaws" that Hamilton 
assured us it was not, rather than the "perfectly harmless" part of the Constitution 
he assured us it was.  Florida v. HHS, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8822, *115, citing 
The Federalist No. 33, at 204-205.     
 The Necessary and Proper Clause is not a stand-alone provision but rather "a 
caveat" granting Congress the necessary means to carry out its enumerated powers. 
Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234, 247 (1960).  Decades of 
precedent support this principle.  United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1956-
1957; Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 739 (1999); Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 
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U.S. 238, 291 (1936); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. at 421-422; Martin v. 
Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. 304 (1816).   
 The Act prevents insurers from denying coverage or charging discriminatory 
rates for persons with preexisting conditions.  Congress could impose reporting 
requirements on insurers to monitor compliance with these legitimate reforms, 
since Congress is "entrusted with ample means" to execute its enumerated powers.  
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. at 408.  
    But if the objective is illegitimate, the fit between means and end is 
irrelevant.  Congress has limited, carefully articulated powers: 
The proposition, often advanced and as often discredited, that the 
power of the federal government inherently extends to purposes 
affecting the nation as a whole with which the states severally cannot 
deal or cannot adequately deal, and the related notion that Congress, 
entirely apart from those powers delegated by the Constitution, may 
enact laws to promote the general welfare, have never been accepted 
but always definitely rejected by this court.     
 
Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. at 291.  The federal government can only 
claim the powers "expressly given, or given by necessary implication."  Martin v. 
Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. at 326.  No power, express or otherwise, undergirds the 
Act's individual mandate.  
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II. THE INDIVIDUAL MANDATE IS IMPROPER BECAUSE IT 
ERODES INDIVIDUAL LIBERTIES AT THE CORE OF AMERICAN 
FREEDOM. 
 The Framers of the Constitution divided authority—among the three 
branches of government, and between the federal and state governments—"to 
ensure protection of our fundamental liberties" and "reduce the risk of tyranny and 
abuse from either front."  United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 552, quoting Gregory 
v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991).  To the Framers, these structural limitations 
were even more vital than the Bill of Rights in safeguarding our freedoms.   A 
Healthy Debate, 158 U. Pa. L. Rev. PENNumbra at 95.  In addition to "affirmative 
delegation," the Framers limited federal powers "by the principle that they may not 
be exercised in a way that violates other specific provisions of the Constitution."  
Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 508 (1999).  The Act stretches the Commerce Clause 
to the breaking point with its novel expansion of federal power and its 
unprecedented restriction of individual liberties. 
 The Act has profound implications for our fundamental liberties, which "are 
inextricably entwined with our idea of physical freedom and self-determination."  
Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 287 (1990) 
(O'Connor, J., concurring).  It requires Americans to enter a contract to pay for a 
service—medical treatment—they are constitutionally privileged to refuse.  This is 
no more constitutional than compelling Americans to donate funds to a church they 
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are not required to attend or otherwise support.  Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 
1, 15-16 (1947).   
 However "necessary" the mandate may appear, it must "consist with the 
letter and spirit of the Constitution" (McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. at 421) and 
not violate or infringe another independent constitutional provision.  
Commonwealth of Va. v. Sebelius, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 778; United States v. 
Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1956-1957; Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 132 (1976); 
United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 115 (1941).  
 The mandate collides with the right of every competent adult to refuse 
medical treatment.  This principle is the "logical corollary of the doctrine of 
informed consent."  Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 270.  See also Washington v. Harper, 494 
U.S. 210, 221-222 (1990) (prisoner has significant liberty interest in avoiding 
unwanted psychotropic drugs); Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 494 (1980) (transfer 
to mental hospital coupled with mandatory behavior modification treatment 
implicated liberty interests).   
 American notions of liberty encompass free choice even in "mandatory 
markets" like food, housing, transportation, and health care.    Everyone must eat 
but may choose what to eat—some are vegetarians, some nutrition conscious, 
others wary of food allergies.  Everyone needs lodging but may choose where to 
live, whether to rent or buy, and whether to live alone or with others.  See Moore v. 
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East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977).  Everyone needs transportation, but may 
choose whether to travel by car, motorcycle, bus, train, airplane, bicycle, or even 
horse and buggy.  Americans may lease or own a vehicle and select the brand, size, 
and color.  In the same way, Americans may choose whether or not to undergo 
medical treatment, and if so, how they will pay for it.  The government cannot 
make vegetables more affordable by requiring everyone to buy spinach or 
eliminate homelessness by demanding that every American purchase a residence.  
See Florida v. HHS, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8822, *86 (applying the government's 
logic to Wickard, Congress could have increased the demand for wheat and raised 
its price by requiring everyone to buy and eat wheat bread). 
 Congress has improperly usurped authority.  Coupled with its massive 
taxing and spending habits, the trend is to "turn everybody into a ward of the state, 
unable to exercise individual choices."  A Healthy Debate, 158 U. Pa. L. Rev. 
PENNumbra at 101.  This is unacceptable in a country of "liberty and justice for 
all." 
A. All Constitutional Rights Have Costs.  
 Unlike the monarchies of past centuries or totalitarian regimes of today, 
America guarantees liberty—free speech, press, association, religion, and the 
freedom to make numerous everyday decisions free of government compulsion.  
But these freedoms have a price.   Free speech requires exposure to the ideas of 
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others.   United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 95 (1944).  ("The price of freedom 
of religion or of speech or of the press is that we must put up with, and even pay 
for, a good deal of rubbish."); Elk Grove United School District v. Newdow, 542 
U.S. 1, 44 (2004) (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("[T]he Constitution does not 
guarantee citizens a right entirely to avoid ideas with which they disagree."). 
 The Government argues that uninsured persons impose costs on third parties 
when they need health care and cannot pay for it.  Florida v. HHS, 2011 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 8822, *84 ("if the costs incurred cannot be paid ...they are passed along 
(cost-shifted) to third parties").  This is similar to reasoning the Supreme Court has 
rejected.  United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564 ("The Government admits, under 
its 'costs of crime' reasoning, that Congress could regulate not only all violent 
crime, but all activities that might lead to violent crime, regardless of how 
tenuously they relate to interstate commerce.")   
 Congress cannot bypass the Constitution merely because it is costly to 
comply with it.  America is not a socialist or communist country where economic 
equality is either possible or desirable.  Such equality endangers the liberty that 
uniquely characterizes America.   
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B. Heart of Atlanta Facilitated The Exercise Of Fundamental 
Individual Rights.  The Act Severely Restricts Basic Freedoms 
That Americans Cherish. 
 In Heart of Atlanta, the Supreme Court validated use of the Commerce 
Clause to implement Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.  The inability to find 
adequate lodging interfered with the right to interstate travel. The Act addressed 
racial discrimination against travelers.  Heart of Atlanta, 379 U.S. at 244.  The 
applicability of Title II was "carefully limited to enterprises having a direct and 
substantial relation to the interstate flow of goods and people."  Id. at 250.  The 
Necessary and Proper Clause applied because elimination of discrimination was a 
legitimate objective under the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments.  
Id. at 276-277 (Black, J., concurring).  In fact, the Enforcement Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment was a source of power independent of the Commerce 
Clause.  Id. at 276-280 (Douglas, J., concurring).     
 In stark contrast, the insurance mandate is an extraordinary restriction of the 
individual liberties that uniquely characterize American government.  It is only 
"necessary" because the Act's insurance industry reforms created a "necessity."  
Unlike Heart of Atlanta, which paved the way for racial minorities to exercise their 
constitutional rights, the Act dismantles cherished American freedoms.   
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C. The Act Is Not Narrowly Tailored To Achieve A Compelling 
Government Purpose. 
 The Fourteenth Amendment "forbids the government to 
infringe...fundamental liberty interests at all...unless the infringement is narrowly 
tailored to serve a compelling state interest."  Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 
(1993).  In exceptional circumstances the state may override the right to refuse 
medical treatment.  Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 24-30 (1905) 
(mandatory smallpox vaccine to contain epidemic).  But "[t]he regulation of 
constitutionally protected decisions...must be predicated on legitimate state 
concerns other than disagreement with the choice the individual has made...."  
Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 435 (1990). 
 The Government's cost-shifting arguments include the observation that many 
hospitals are obligated to provide emergency screening and services regardless of 
ability to pay.  Liberty Univ., Inc. v. Geithner, No. 6:10cv15, 2010 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 125922, *43 n. 15 (W.D. Va. Nov. 30, 2010), citing the Emergency 
Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd.  But the minimum 
coverage provisions of PPAHCA extend far beyond mandatory emergency 
treatment.  This is hardly the "narrow tailoring" the Constitution requires.  
 Congress could enable health care reform using narrowly tailored means that 
would not trample individual rights.  New tax incentives could be crafted to 
encourage individuals and employers to purchase health insurance.  These are easy 
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to administer and more cost-effective than enforcing the mandate and penalties.  
Uninsured persons could be denied non-emergency services if they cannot pay.  
Insurance companies could be granted flexibility to charge higher premiums for 
new enrollees with preexisting conditions.  Congress should be sent back to the 
drawing board to consider constitutional solutions for health care reform. 
III.   THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY STRUCK DOWN THE 
ENTIRE ACT IN ORDER TO PROTECT THE DOCTRINE OF 
SEPARATION OF POWERS AS MANDATED BY THE 
CONSTITUTION.   
 Severance is a matter of judicial restraint.  Florida v. HHS, 2011 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 8822, *117; Free Enter. Fund v. Public Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 
S. Ct. 3138, 3161 (2010).  Courts honor separation-of-powers principles by 
carefully severing flawed statutes while leaving the remainder intact.  But if the 
court must carve up, rearrange, and rewrite too much—it is best to invalidate the 
entire scheme.     
 Severability dates back to Marbury v. Madison, where the Supreme Court 
shaved one unconstitutional section from the Judiciary Act of 1789 and left the rest 
intact.  C. Vered Jona, Note: Cleaning Up for Congress: Why Courts Should Reject 
the Presumption of Severability in the Face of Intentionally Unconstitutional 
Legislation, 76 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 698, 701 (April 2008) ("Cleaning Up"); David 
H. Gans, Severability as Judicial Lawmaking, 76 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 639, 661-662 
(2008) ("Judicial Lawmaking").  Severance is appropriate unless it disrupts 
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legislative intent.  Bank of Hamilton v. Dudley's Lease, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 492, 526 
(1829); Allen v. Louisiana, 103 U.S. 80, 84 (1880).  Courts must not effectively 
make new laws rather than enforcing old ones.  United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 
214, 221 (1875); Hill v. Wallace, 259 U.S. 44, 70-71 (1922).   
 Severability "is not a rigid and inflexible rule"—particularly in a novel case.  
Florida v. HHS, 2011 U.S. Dist. Lexis 8822, *118.  The Act radically exceeds the 
powers of Congress and assaults individual liberty.  But striking down only the 
individual mandate would leave the Act in shambles.  The District Court properly 
eschewed judicial rewriting and remanded the Act to Congress. 
A. The Court Cannot Conform The Act To The Constitution 
Without Performing Radical Surgery—A Quintessentially 
Legislative Function. 
 Severance shapes the contours of judicial relief after a court has found a 
statute unconstitutional in part.  Courts must guard against rewriting a law as they 
try to salvage it.  Florida v. HHS, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8822, *130; Ayotte v. 
Planned Parenthood of New England, 546 U.S. 320, 329-330 (2006); Virginia v. 
American Booksellers Ass'n., Inc., 484 U.S. 383, 397 (1988).  Conventional 
wisdom suggests that striking the entire Act would be more intrusive than merely 
severing invalid parts.  Judicial Lawmaking, 76 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. at 672.  But 
like a Presidential veto, total invalidation "functions like a remand" (id. at 673) and 
"preserves [the] court's role as an adjudicatory rather than a legislature body."  
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Cleaning Up, 76 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. at 712.  Reconfiguring this massive, 2700-
page Act is "a far more serious invasion of the legislative domain" than any court 
should undertake.  Florida v. HHS, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8822, *131-132, 
quoting Ayotte, 546 U.S. at 329-330.   
 The Act is not a series of short statutes arranged together for convenience 
and thus easily severed or fine-tuned, but rather a "carefully-balanced and 
clockwork-like statutory arrangement comprised of pieces that all work toward one 
primary legislative goal."  Florida v. HHS, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8822, *118-
119.  The invalid mandate is the glue that holds the Act together.  The Act has too 
many interdependent moving parts to carve out the mandate without doing 
violence to the entire scheme.  Id.  The mandate is a legislative lynchpin 
"inextricably bound" to the remaining provisions.  Sometimes the connection is 
obvious—the limited exemptions, employer mandates, and contents of a minimum 
benefits package.  Other provisions may not hinge on the individual mandate.  As 
Judge Vinson noted, e.g., it is impossible to know whether the revenue generating 
Form 1099 provision would "stand independently of the insurance reforms."  Id. at 
*133-134.  The Act "must stand or fall as a single unit."  Id. at *135-136.    
 The Supreme Court recently declined to "blue-pencil" legislation, noting 
some possibilities but leaving it to Congress to sort out the options.  Free 
Enterprise Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3162.   The Court cannot foresee how Congress 
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might revamp the Act in response to its constitutional flaws.  Randall v. Sorrell, 
548 U.S. 230, 262 (2006).  In United States v. Nat'l Treasury Emps. Union, 513 
U.S. 454 (1995), the Court refused to craft a new "nexus requirement" when 
considering an honoraria ban applied to federal employees, finding that would 
involve "a far more serious invasion of the legislative domain" than the simple fix 
applied in United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 180-183 (1983) (striking down 
ban on expression in the Supreme Court building and grounds, but only as applied 
to public sidewalks around the Court). 
 There is inevitably some overlap among the branches of government.  
Judicial Lawmaking, 76 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. at 653; Paul M. Bator, Constitution as 
Architecture: Legislative and Administrative Courts Under Article III, 65 Ind. L.J. 
233, 265 (1990).  But courts must avoid encroaching on legislative territory by 
using "radical surgery" to save a statute.  Judicial Lawmaking, 76 Geo. Wash. L. 
Rev. at 689.  Here, removal of the mandate would impermissibly entangle the 
Court in legislative alterations. 
B. The Presumption Of Severability Should Be Abandoned Because 
Congress Had Knowledge Of The Act's Constitutional Flaws.   
 Legislators take an oath to "support [the] Constitution."  U.S. Const. art. VI.  
But sometimes Congress enacts legislation that "even supporters acknowledge 
poses serious constitutional concerns."  Michael D. Shumsky, Severability, 
Inseverability, and the Rule of Law, 41 Harv. J. on Legis. 227, 277 (2004) (citing 
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Joel Mowbray, The Bush Way of Compromise, Wash. Times, Apr. 12, 2002, at 
A23).   
 This case is a striking example of legislators flouting their constitutional 
oath.  Instead of examining the constitutional implications, this "2,700 page bill 
was rushed to the floor for a Christmas Eve vote."  Commonwealth of Va. v. 
Sebelius, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 789.  Even Congress' own attorneys warned that legal 
challenges might have merit.  Florida v. HHS, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8822, *124; 
see Jennifer Staman & Cynthia Brougher, Congressional Research Service, 
Requiring Individuals to Obtain Health Insurance: A Constitutional Analysis, July 
24, 2009, at 3, 6 ("whether Congress can use its Commerce Clause authority to 
require a person to buy a good or a service" raises a "novel issue" and "most 
challenging question").1  A severability clause included in an early version of the 
Act was ultimately excised.  Florida v. HHS, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8822, *123-
124.  There is strong evidence that Congress deliberately demanded inclusion of 
the controversial mandate—fully aware it had flaws. 
 Severability allows legislators to pass laws without being held to a standard 
of perfection, knowing that "courts will not throw out the baby with the bath 
water."  Cleaning Up, 76 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. at 654.  But inseverability is an 
appropriate presumption where Congress purposely enacts defective legislation.  
                     
1 Available at http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/R40725_20090724.pdf. 
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Cleaning Up, 76 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. at 700.  That presumption would encourage 
legislators to draft constitutional laws, promote accountability to constituents, and 
discourage judicial redrafting.  Id.  
C. Severance Would Thwart The Objectives Of Congress. 
 Striking down a statute "frustrates the intent of the elected representatives of 
the people."  Florida v. HHS, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8822, *130, quoting Ayotte, 
546 U.S. at 329-330.  Courts sever to avoid circumventing legislative intent.  Id.  
But in this case, severance would frustrate that intent.   
 Critical questions must be addressed.  Would Congress have passed the Act 
without the mandate?  Would it prefer a truncated Act—or no statute at all?  If the 
mandate is severed, can the remaining provisions function independently and still 
serve congressional intent?  See Free Enterprise Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3161-3162; 
United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 246 (2005); New York v. United States, 505 
U.S. 144, 186 (1992); Ayotte, 546 U.S. at 330; Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 
U.S. 678, 684 (1987); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 108-109; Champlin Refining 
Co. v. Corp. Comm'n of Okla., 286 U.S. 210, 234 (1932); Allen v. Louisiana, 103 
U.S. at 83-84. 
1. It Is Virtually Certain That Congress Would Not Have 
Passed The Act Without The Individual Mandate.  
 Language in the Act itself exposes congressional intent:  "The [mandate] is 
essential to creating effective health insurance markets...."  Act § 1501(a)(2)(I). 
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 Severance is appropriate where legislative goals would still be served.   
Florida v. HHS, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8822, *122; New York v. United States, 
505 U.S. at 187.  A small uncontroversial provision is normally severable.  Alaska 
Airlines, 480 U.S. at 694 n. 18, 696 (duty-to-hire provisions severed from 
unconstitutional regulations).  But where the legislature would not have enacted 
the legislation without a lynchpin provision, severance is improper.   
 The District Court concluded that the mandate is "indisputably essential to 
what Congress was ultimately seeking to accomplish."  Florida v. HHS, 2011 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 8822, *122.  Defendants concede the point.  Id. at *125.  Recent 
decisions all describe the mandate as central:  Commonwealth of Va. v. Sebelius, 
728 F. Supp. 2d at 776 ("necessary measure to ensure the success of its larger 
reforms of the interstate health insurance market...without full market participation, 
the financial foundation supporting the health care system will fail, in effect 
causing the entire health care regime to 'implode'"); Thomas More Law Center v. 
Obama, 720 F. Supp. 2d 882, 886 (E.D. Mich. 2010) ("[i]ntegral to the legislative 
effort...essential part of this larger regulation of economic activity"); Liberty Univ., 
Inc. v. Geithner, at *48, *82 (essential); Goudy-Bachman v. U.S. Dep't. of Health 
& Human Servs., No. 1:10-CV-763, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6309, *5 (M.D. Pa. 
Jan. 24, 2011) ("backbone provision"). 
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 However misguided the constitutional analysis, congressional intent is clear:  
The mandate is mandatory—the Act unravels without it.   
2. Even If The Remaining Provisions Could Function 
Independently—A Truncated Act Would Not Serve 
Congressional Purposes.  
 It is a closer question as to whether the remaining provisions could function 
independently.  Some sections are only remotely related to health care and could 
stand alone.  Florida v. HHS, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8822, *119-120.  But the 
more critical inquiry is whether an abridged version of the Act would function "in 
a manner consistent with the intent of Congress."  Id. at *120-121, quoting Alaska 
Airlines, 480 U.S. at 685.      
 Sometimes a legislative scheme can survive judicial surgery and still serve 
the legislature's purposes.  Free Enterprise Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3161 (tenure 
restrictions severed); Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 882-883 (1997) (overbroad 
Communications Decency Act salvaged by striking the words "or indecent"); 
Alaska Airlines, 480 U.S. at 684 (legislative veto easily severed); Brockett v. 
Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 591, 506-507 (1985) (severing mandatory 
penalties for persons dealing in obscenity and prostitution); Tilton v. Richardson, 
403 U.S. 672, 684 (1971) (20-year limit on religious use restrictions violated 
Establishment Clause but not essential to the statutory scheme).  In New York v. 
United States, the Court severed a punitive "take title" provision without 
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demolishing the legislative scheme, which included independent incentives for 
States to dispose of radioactive waste.  New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 186-
187.      
 This case is different.  The District Court analogized the Act to "a 
defectively designed watch" that "needs to be redesigned and reconstructed by the 
watchmaker."  Florida v. HHS, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8822, *134-135.  The 
Court properly declined to undertake the massive task of trying to salvage the Act 
by sorting through its myriad provisions.    
3. The Absence Of A Severability Clause Weighs Against 
Preserving The Remaining Provisions.   
 A severability clause—if the Act contained one—would signal an intention 
to make the Act divisible.  Champlin, 286 U.S. at 235.  But such a clause merely 
creates a rebuttable presumption.  Id. 286 at 235.  It is not an "inexorable 
command."  Dorchy v. Kansas, 264 U.S. 286, 290 (1924).   
 Even on the legislature's cue, severance "enmeshes courts 
in...quintessentially legislative policy work."  Judicial Lawmaking, 76 Geo. Wash. 
L. Rev. at 687.  On the other hand, the absence of a severability clause creates no 
presumption.  Alaska Airlines, 480 U.S. at 686; New York v. United States, 505 
U.S. at 186.  The omission does not "dictate the demise of the entire [Act]."  Tilton 
v. Richardson, 403 U.S. at 684.   
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 The Act has no severability clause.  Although there is no presumption, the 
omission constitutes evidence that severability was not a priority on the minds of 
legislators and logically presents a stronger case against severability than if the 
clause had been included.  Florida v. HHS, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8822, *122.  
And there is additional persuasive evidence.  A severability clause was included in 
an earlier draft of the Act but ultimately removed.  Id. at *123-124.  The mandate 
was controversial during the drafting of the Act, and challenges were on the 
horizon.  Id. at *124.  The District Court action was filed just minutes after the 
President signed the Act.  Id. at *6. 
 Even if the Act contained a severability clause, that would not settle the 
issue.  Nearly a century ago, the Supreme Court found the valid provisions of the 
Future Trading Act "so interwoven with those [unconstitutional] regulations that 
they [could] not be separated"—in spite of a severability clause.  Hill v. Wallace, 
259 U.S. at 70; Cleaning Up, 76 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. at 702.  PPAHCA is 
similar—hundreds of detailed interrelated provisions. 
 Neither the presence nor the absence of a severability clause conclusively 
dictates the outcome.  But the Act's complexity, its multitude of interwoven 
provisions, and the intentional removal of a severability clause all reinforce the 
wisdom of remanding the entire scheme to Congress.  In fact, if a severability 
clause were invoked "to salvage parts of a comprehensive, integrated statutory 
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scheme, which parts, standing alone, are unworkable and in many aspects unfair, 
[that would] exalt a formula at the expense of the broad objectives of Congress."  
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 255 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).  In the absence of such 
a clause, it is all the more appropriate to avoid dissecting this mammoth piece of 
legislation. 
CONCLUSION 
 The District Court decision, striking the Act in its entirety, should be 
affirmed. 
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